Mishnayos Shevuos Perek 3 Mishnah 5
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שבועות פרק ג׳ משנה ה׳
If one unwittingly takes a false oath about the past or breaks an oath he made about the future, both if it is an oath that addresses matters that concern oneself and if it is an oath that addresses matters that concern others, he is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering for an oath on an utterance. And likewise, an oath on an utterance may address both tangible matters and intangible matters. How so? Examples of oaths about future actions that concern others are if one said: On my oath I will give so-and-so a particular item, or: On my oath I will not give it to him. Examples of such oaths about the past are if one said: On my oath I gave another a particular item, or: On my oath I did not give it to him. Examples of oaths about the future that address intangible matters are where one said: On my oath I will sleep, or: On my oath I will not sleep. Examples of such oaths about the past are where one said: On my oath I slept, or: On my oath I did not sleep. Other examples of oaths about intangible matters are when one takes an oath, saying: I will throw a stone into the sea, or: I will not throw it, or: I threw it, or: I did not throw it. Rabbi Yishmael says: One is liable only for an oath on an utterance taken about the future, as it is stated: “Or if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips to do evil, or to do good, whatsoever it be that a man shall utter clearly with an oath” (Leviticus 5:4). The Torah refers explicitly only to oaths about what one will do in the future. Rabbi Akiva said to him: If so, and one is liable only for oaths explicitly mentioned in the verse, then I have derived only that one is liable for an oath on an utterance with regard to matters to which doing evil and doing good apply. From where do I derive that one is liable for an oath on an utterance with regard to matters to which doing evil and doing good do not apply? Rabbi Yishmael said to him: The halakha in these cases is derived by amplification of the meaning of the verse. Rabbi Akiva said to him: If the verse is amplified for this, i.e., to extend the halakha of an oath on an utterance to matters that do not involve doing evil or good, the verse is amplified for that, i.e., oaths about the past.
אֶחָד דְּבָרִים שֶׁל עַצְמוֹ, וְאֶחָד דְּבָרִים שֶׁל אֲחֵרִים, וְאֶחָד דְּבָרִים שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהֶן מַמָּשׁ, וְאֶחָד דְּבָרִים שֶׁאֵין בָּהֶם מַמָּשׁ. כֵּיצַד. אָמַר, שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֶתֵּן לְאִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי וְשֶׁלֹּא אֶתֵּן, שֶׁנָּתַתִּי וְשֶׁלֹּא נָתַתִּי, שֶׁאִישַׁן וְשֶׁלֹּא אִישַׁן, שֶׁיָּשַׁנְתִּי וְשֶׁלֹּא יָשַׁנְתִּי, שֶׁאֶזְרֹק צְרוֹר לַיָּם וְשֶׁלֹּא אֶזְרֹק, שֶׁזָּרַקְתִּי וְשֶׁלֹּא זָרַקְתִּי. רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אוֹמֵר, אֵינוֹ חַיָּב אֶלָּא עַל הֶעָתִיד לָבֹא, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ויקרא ה) לְהָרַע אוֹ לְהֵיטִיב. אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, אִם כֵּן אֵין לִי אֶלָּא דְבָרִים שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהֶן הֲרָעָה וַהֲטָבָה, דְּבָרִים שֶׁאֵין בָּהֶן הֲרָעָה וַהֲטָבָה מִנַּיִן. אָמַר לוֹ, מֵרִבּוּי הַכָּתוּב. אָמַר לוֹ, אִם רִבָּה הַכָּתוּב לְכָךְ, רִבָּה הַכָּתוּב לְכָךְ:
Bartenura
ואחד דברים של אחרים. כדמפרש שאתן לפלוני:
שאין בהן ממש. תרי גווני משמע, כגון שינה, ומשמע שאין בהם הנאה כגון שאזרוק צרור לים:
מריבוי הכתוב. לכל אשר יבטא האדם. ופלוגתא דר׳ עקיבא ור׳ ישמעאל, דר״ע דריש בכל התורה רבויי ומעוטי, ורבי ישמעאל דריש כללי ופרטי. ר״ע דריש או נפש כי תשבע ריבה, להרע או להיטיב מיעט, לכל אשר יבטא חזר וריבה ריבה. ומיעט וריבה, ריבה הכל. מאי ריבה, ריבה כל מילי לשעבר כלהבא. ומאי מיעט, מיעט דבר מצוה. ור׳ ישמעאל דריש, או נפש כי תשבע כלל, להרע או להטיב פרט, לכל אשר יבטא חזר וכלל. כלל ופרט וכלל אי אתה דן אלא כעין הפרט, מה הפרט מפורש להבא, אף כל להבא. והלכה כר״ע:
ואחד דברם של אחרים – as he explains that I will give [something] to so-and-so.
שאין בהן ממש – it implies two ways, as, for example, he changed and implies that he changed it and it implies that there is no benefit in them, as for example, “that I will throw a stone into the sea.”
מרבוי הכתוב (from an extension supplied by Scripture) – (Leviticus 5:4): “whatever a man may utter in an oath [- and, though he has known it, the fact has escaped him].” But there is a dispute between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael, for Rabbi Akiva expounds throughout the Torah extensions [of the scope of Biblical texts] and limitations of Biblical texts, but Rabbi Yishmael expounds general rules/principles and specifications; Rabbi Akiva expounds (Leviticus 5:4): “Or when a person utters an oath” is an extension, “to a bad or good purpose” is a limitation. What is an extension. What is an extension of scope? An extension are all words of what he did in the past like what will take place in the future; and what is a limitation? He limits the matter of a commandment. But Rabbi Yishmael expounds (Leviticus 5:4): “Or when a man utters an oath,” is a generalization; “to a bad or good purpose” (Leviticus 5:4) is a specification; “whatever a man may utter by an oath” (Leviticus 5:4), he once again states a generalization: “a generalization and a specification and [followed by] a generalization, one is guided by what the specification implies; just as the specification is interpreted for what happens in the future, so also everything regarding what will happen in the future. But the Halakha is according to Rabbi Akiva.