Mishnah.org Logo

Mishnayos Bava Kamma Perek 2 Mishnah 5

בבא קמא פרק ב׳ משנה ה׳

5

And what is the case of the ox that causes damage while on the property of the injured party, mentioned in an earlier mishna (15b) that listed animals that are forewarned? If the animal gored, pushed, bit, squatted upon, or kicked another animal in the public domain, the owner is liable to pay half the cost of the damage if the ox was innocuous, but if it acted while on the property of the injured party, Rabbi Tarfon says: He must pay the full cost of the damage, and the Rabbis say: He must pay half the cost of the damage, as in any other case classified as Goring. Rabbi Tarfon said to the Rabbis: If in a place where the Torah was lenient with regard to damage classified as Eating and with regard to Trampling, specifically in the public domain, as the owner is exempt from liability, nevertheless the Torah was strict with regard to these forms of damage if they occurred on the property of the injured party, requiring him to pay the full cost of the damage, then in a place where the Torah was strict with regard to cases of damage classified as Goring, specifically in the public domain, requiring the owner liable to pay for half the cost of the damage, is it not right that we should be strict with regard to this form of damage if it occurs on the property of the injured party to likewise require the owner of the animal to pay the full cost of the damage? The Rabbis said to him: Although there is an a fortiori inference being applied here, still it is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source, meaning that the halakha cannot be stricter with the inference than it is with the case that serves as the source of the inference. Therefore, just as one is liable to pay half the cost of the damage classified as Goring in the public domain, so too, for damage classified as Goring on the property of the injured party he is liable to pay only half the cost of the damage. Rabbi Tarfon said to them: If that is your opinion, then I as well will not derive an inference with regard to Goring from a different case of Goring. I will instead derive an inference with regard to Goring from Trampling: And if in a place where the Torah was lenient with regard to damage classified as Eating and Trampling, specifically in the public domain, as the owner is exempt from liability, nevertheless the Torah was strict with regard to damage classified as Goring, requiring him to pay half the cost of the damage, then in a place where the Torah was strict with regard to damage classified as Eating and Trampling, specifically on the property of the injured party as the animal’s owner is obligated to pay the full cost of the damage, is it not right that we should be equally strict with regard to damage classified as Goring and require payment of the full cost of the damage in this case as well? The Rabbis said to him: Here as well, it is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source, and therefore, just as one is liable to pay half the cost of the damage classified as Goring in the public domain, so too, for damage classified as Goring on the property of the injured party he will be liable to pay only half the cost of the damage, as ultimately your inference still depends on the fact that for Goring in the public domain one pays half the cost of the damage.

שׁוֹר הַמַּזִּיק בִּרְשׁוּת הַנִּזָּק כֵּיצַד. נָגַח, נָגַף, נָשַׁךְ, רָבַץ, בָּעַט, בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, מְשַׁלֵּם חֲצִי נֶזֶק. בִּרְשׁוּת הַנִּזָּק, רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן אוֹמֵר נֶזֶק שָׁלֵם, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים חֲצִי נֶזֶק. אָמַר לָהֶם רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן, וּמַה בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁהֵקֵל עַל הַשֵּׁן וְעַל הָרֶגֶל בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, שֶׁהוּא פָטוּר, הֶחְמִיר עֲלֵיהֶם בִּרְשׁוּת הַנִּזָּק לְשַׁלֵּם נֶזֶק שָׁלֵם, מְקוֹם שֶׁהֶחְמִיר עַל הַקֶּרֶן בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, לְשַׁלֵּם חֲצִי נֶזֶק, אֵינוֹ דִין שֶׁנַּחְמִיר עָלֶיהָ בִּרְשׁוּת הַנִּזָּק לְשַׁלֵּם נֶזֶק שָׁלֵם. אָמְרוּ לוֹ, דַּיּוֹ לַבָּא מִן הַדִּין לִהְיוֹת כַּנִּדּוֹן, מַה בִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים חֲצִי נֶזֶק, אַף בִּרְשׁוּת הַנִּזָּק חֲצִי נֶזֶק. אָמַר לָהֶם, אֲנִי לֹא אָדוּן קֶרֶן מִקֶּרֶן, אֲנִי אָדוּן קֶרֶן מֵרֶגֶל. וּמַה בִמְקוֹם שֶׁהֵקֵל עַל הַשֵּׁן וְעַל הָרֶגֶל, בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, הֶחְמִיר בַּקֶּרֶן, מְקוֹם שֶׁהֶחְמִיר עַל הַשֵּׁן וְעַל הָרֶגֶל, בִּרְשׁוּת הַנִּזָּק, אֵינוֹ דִין שֶׁנַּחְמִיר בַּקֶּרֶן. אָמְרוּ לוֹ, דַּיּוֹ לַבָּא מִן הַדִּין לִהְיוֹת כַּנִּדּוֹן, מַה בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים חֲצִי נֶזֶק, אַף בִּרְשׁוּת הַנִּזָּק חֲצִי נֶזֶק:

ה׳
Bartenura

נגח נגף [וכו'] – all of them are derivatives of the horn.

דיו לבא מן הדין להיות כנדון – the “horn” in the domain of the one who suffered damages that you bring from the law of the “horn” in the public domain, and as you have said regarding the horn which [the Rabbis] were stringent about it in the public domain, does it not follow logically that we should be strict with it in the domain of the one who supported the damages. It is sufficient that it (i.e., the inferred law) should be like that of the premise, like the horn in the public domain, and not be liable in the domain of the one who suffered damages other than one-half damages just as he is liable in the private domain.

אני לא אדון קרן מקרן – as we stated above, but rather the “horn” from the “foot.” The place where he was stringent upon him with the “tooth” and the “foot” does it not follow logically that we should be stringent with the “horn?”

דיו לבא מן הדין – for finally, if it is not the “horn” in the public domain, you will not find a side for an a-minori/a-majori. And Rabbi Tarfon, although that in general, he holds that it is enough for it is from the Torah as it is written (Numbers 12:14): “Would she not bear her shame for seven days?” All the more so for God’s presence for fourteen days, but it is enough if the inferred law be as strict as the premise, therefore, “she should be shut out of the camp for seven days” (Numbers 12:14) and no more than that. Nevertheless, here, he does not hold that it is enough for Rabbi Tarfon holds that when we state that it is enough where he didn’t refute an a-minori/a-majori such as there (i.e., Numbers 12:14) of the seven days of God’s Divine presence is not written [in the Biblical verse], the Kal V’Homer brings fourteen. The “it is enough” comes to exclude seven and to establish seven since it mentions this Kal V’Homer for these seven that has been established and it doesn’t refute it completely. But here, the half-damages are written, whether for the public domain or whether in the courtyard of the one who suffered damages, and the Kal V’aHomer comes and brings another one-half damage and makes it full damages. If he had expounded on the “it is enough” and you established ait as high-damages as at the beginning, I would raise to him the objection of the Kal V’Homer and not benefit from it at all. But the Rabbis hold that even where they raise the objection of the Kal V’Homer, we state it as “it is enough” and the Halakha is according to the Sages.

נגח נגף וכו׳ כולן תולדות קרן הן:

דיו לבא מן הדין להיות כנדון. קרן ברשות הניזק שאתה מביא מדין קרן ברה״ר. דקאמרת קרן שהחמיר עליה ברה״ר אינו דין שנחמיר עליה ברשות הניזק. דיו להיות כנדון, כקרן ברה״ר, ולא יהיה חייב ברשות הניזק אלא חצי נזק כמו שהוא חייב ברה״ר:

אני לא אדון קרן מקרן. כדאמרן לעיל, אלא קרן מרגל. מקום שהחמיר עליו בשן ורגל אינו דין שנחמיר בקרן:

דיו לבא מן הדין. דסוף סוף אי לאו קרן ברשות הרבים לא משכחת צד קל וחומר. ורבי טרפון אע״ג דבעלמא אית ליה דיו, דמדאורייתא הוא, דכתיב (במדבר י״ב:י״ד) הלא תכלם שבעת ימים, קל וחומר לשכינה י״ד יום, אלא דיו לבא מן הדין להיות כנדון, הלכך תסגר שבעת ימים ותו לא. מ״מ הכא לית ליה דיו, דסבירא ליה לר׳ טרפון דכי אמרינן דיו היכא דלא מפריך קל וחומר, כגון התם דשבעת ימים דשכינה לא כתיבי, אתא קל וחומר אייתי ארביסר, אתא דיו אפיק שבעה, ואוקי שבעה, אשתכח דאהני קל וחומר להני שבעה דאוקימנא ולא אפריך לגמרי. אבל הכא חצי נזק כתיב בין ברה״ר בין בחצר הניזק, ואתא קל וחומר ואייתי חצי נזק אחרינא ונעשה נזק שלם, אי דרשת דיו ותוקמיה אחצי נזק כדמעיקרא, אפריך ליה קל וחומר ולא אהני ולא מידי. ורבנן סברי דאפילו היכא דמפריך קל וחומר אמרינן דיו. והלכה כחכמים: